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INTRODUCTION
During his 2006 State of the Union address, President George W.
Bush faced an unexpected show of unity from Democratic legislators.
After the President noted, with visible regret, that Congress had failed
to push forward his plan to privatize at least part of the Social Security
program,1 the Democrats—who had precious little to cheer about in
the President’s speech up to that point—spontaneously rose to their
† Associate Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School; Visiting
Professor of Law, New York University School of Law.  J.D., University of Michigan Law
School; Ph.D. (economics), Harvard University.  I would like to thank Lily Batchelder,
Charles Davenport, Michael Dorf, David Gamage, and the participants in the 2006 Junior
Tax Scholars Conference for helpful feedback, and the editors of this Symposium for invit-
ing me to participate in this important discussion.  Ketan Pastakia provided excellent re-
search assistance, as always.  The editors at the Cornell Law Review were unfailingly helpful
and patient, and their efforts substantially improved the final product.
1 See WHITE HOUSE, MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSMIT-
TING A REPORT ON THE STATE OF THE UNION, H.R. DOC. NO. 109-80, at 6 (2006).
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feet and applauded.2  The Democrats were clearly proud that they
had prevented what they viewed as an assault on a signature social
program3 and had derailed the major domestic policy initiative of the
President’s second term.4  After regaining his composure, President
Bush shook his finger at the Democratic side of the chamber5 and
stated, “[Y]et the rising cost of entitlements is a problem that is not
going away—and with every year we fail to act, the situation gets
worse.”6  He then called on Congress to create a bipartisan commis-
sion “to examine the full impact of Baby Boom retirements on Social
Security, Medicare, and Medicaid.”7
Thus, even though President Bush’s own tax reform commis-
sion’s late 2005 recommendations had gone nowhere in Congress,8
the President called for yet another commission to study Social Secur-
ity and the country’s two government-financed medical care pro-
grams, Medicare and Medicaid.9  The President warned that those
three programs “would soon swamp the federal budget if Congress
failed to act as millions of Baby Boomers turn 60 and prepare for re-
tirement.”10  President Bush’s proposal to create a bipartisan commis-
sion may have been a cynical attempt to sweep a difficult problem
under the rug, or it may have been an honest attempt to seek expert
assistance with what he believes is an intractable problem.11  The
more fundamental question, however, is whether there really is an in-
2 See Elisabeth Bumiller & Adam Nagourney, Bush, Resetting Agenda, Says U.S. Must
Cut Reliance on Oil, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2006, at A1.
3 See, e.g., Press Release, Charles B. Rangel, Ranking Member Rangel on House
Republicans “Frontal Assault” on Social Security (June 22, 2005), available at http://
www.house.gov/list/press/wm31_democrats/050622_Rangel_Frontal_Assault_on_SS.html
(“[T]he House Republicans have announced a direct frontal assault on Social Security
through privatization.”).
4 See White House, Policies and Initiatives, http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/
(claiming that the President is committed to strengthening Social Security) (last visited
October 9, 2006).
5 See Bumiller & Nagourney, supra note 2. R
6 WHITE HOUSE, MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING
A REPORT ON THE STATE OF THE UNION, H.R. DOC. NO. 109-80, at 6 (2006).
7 Id.
8 Cf. Neil H. Buchanan, The Case Against Income Averaging, 25 VA. TAX REV. 1151, 1153
& n.2 (2006) (discussing the limited attention that President Bush’s tax reform recommen-
dations received from Congress and noting the lack of action it generated).
9 See WHITE HOUSE, MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSMIT-
TING A REPORT ON THE STATE OF THE UNION, H.R. DOC. NO. 109-80, at 6 (2006); cf. Carla
Anne Robbins, Waiting (and Hoping) for Jim Baker, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2006, at A16 (“Blue-
ribbon panels . . . are a staple of Washington life.  Some—like the 1980s Social Security
commission—produce real solutions.  Many are forgotten hours after their embargoed-for-
release stamp expires.”).
10 Bumiller & Nagourney, supra note 2. R
11 Cf. WHITE HOUSE, MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSMIT-
TING A REPORT ON THE STATE OF THE UNION, H.R. DOC. NO. 109-80, at 6 (2006) (stating the
need to “save” Social Security and its worsening problems).
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tractable problem with Social Security that the government must deal
with, and if so, whether the government must address that problem
sooner rather than later.  There certainly is a widely held assumption
that a serious problem is on the horizon for the Social Security pro-
gram,12 as well as for Medicare and Medicaid.13
Democrats appear to share this assumption,14 differing from
Republicans only in how to address the problem.15  In their opposi-
tion to privatization,16 the Democrats’ position begins with a funda-
mental difference in philosophy about the appropriate size and scope
of government.  As an analytical matter, and assuming that there re-
ally is a long-term financing problem facing Social Security, the Demo-
crats were correct in claiming that private accounts would not solve
the problem.17  Indeed, creating private accounts would not change
any underlying demographic or financial challenges but would simply
change the form in which national dissaving would occur over the
next several decades.18
12 Compare Exploring the Economics of Retirement: Hearing Before the Special Comm. on Aging,
109th Cong. 7 (2005), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?
dbname=109_senate_hearings&docid=f:21037.pdf [hereinafter Economics of Retirement]
(statement of Sen. Susan Collins, Member, Special Comm. on Aging) (“Unfortunately, as
successful as Social Security has been, we know that the system faces serious long-term
financing problems and is simply not sustainable in its current form.  While the system is
sound today, it will not be able to meet its obligations to future retirees unless it is modern-
ized.”), with Editorial, No Social Security “Crisis,” WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 2005, at A16 (asserting
that Social Security is “less a crisis than a problem”).
13 See Economics of Retirement, supra note 12, at 3 (statement of Sen. Herb Kohl, Mem- R
ber, Special Comm. on Aging).  For example, even in a news item that is not labeled as
commentary or opinion, journalists feel comfortable stating as fact that “either benefit cuts
or tax increases [are necessary] to deal with the financial problems looming over the social
welfare programs.”  Bumiller & Nagourney, supra note 2. R
14 See Robert J. Samuelson, Editorial, It’s More than Social Security, WASH. POST, Jan. 14,
2005, at A19.
15 See id. (“Democrats argue that ‘the Social Security problem’ can be fixed with toler-
able tax increases and benefit cuts, imposed mostly on the upper middle class and the
rich.”).
16 See Susan Milligan, Democrats Vow No Negotiation on Plan to Alter Retirement Program,
BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 7, 2005, at A4.
17 See Economics of Retirement, supra note 12, at 2 (statement of Sen. Herb Kohl) (“Mr. R
Chairman, as you have said, private accounts will do nothing to improve Social Security’s
solvency, and they would not meet your goal, which I share, of increasing national
saving.”).
18 See infra Part I.A. See generally MICHAEL HILTZIK, THE PLOT AGAINST SOCIAL SECURITY
125–42 (2005) (discussing the development of lobbying for private saving).  We can para-
phrase the issue as follows: President Bush’s plan would divert trillions of dollars of reve-
nues from the Social Security system into private accounts. See Rick Klein, Bush Agenda
Faces Some GOP Resistance, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 18, 2005, at A1.  Those accounts would then
be invested in the financial markets, to which the Social Security system (through the Trea-
sury) would then have to turn to finance the very revenue shortfall that the introduction of
private accounts created. See Aaron Bernstein, Social Security: Are Private Accounts a Good
Idea?, BUS. WK., Jan. 24, 2005, at 64 (“The Bush Commission plan would require Washing-
ton to borrow at least $160 billion a year in the early years.”).  The plan would not change
net national saving. See Edmund L. Andrews, Savings: Lots of Talk, But Few Dollars, N.Y.
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Although their opposition to the President’s call for private ac-
counts was sound, the Democrats predicated that opposition on a po-
litically expedient—but ultimately false—premise.  They conceded
that Social Security was in trouble on a long-term basis,19 faulting the
President only (albeit correctly) for saying that private accounts would
fix that problem.20  Democratic Senator Edward M. Kennedy bluntly
stated: “We’re not going to negotiate with someone that’s trying to
destroy [Social Security]. . . .  Privatization cannot be on the table.”21
Senate Minority Whip Richard Durbin declared: “The privatization
proposal of the president is going to destroy Social Security as we
know it. . . .  It doesn’t strengthen Social Security.  It weakens it.  It
doesn’t address the solvency problem.”22  Democrats also argued that
Bush would have to drop his privatization proposal “before they nego-
tiate to save Social Security.”23  The Democrats’ current position thus
continues an approach begun by former President Bill Clinton, who
argued that the government should use the projected budget sur-
pluses to “save Social Security first,”24 a call that Republicans later
used to argue that the system really was in crisis.25
In a recent article,26 I examined whether a proposed system of
accounting known as “Generational Accounting” was an appropriate
way to measure the long-term fiscal position of the U.S. government.  I
concluded that it was not.27  In introducing that analysis, I described
TIMES, Mar. 13, 2005, § 3, at 6 (“‘Moving to a forced savings account technically does not
materially affect net national savings.’” (quoting Alan Greenspan, chairman of the Federal
Reserve)).  This assumes away any effects on saving or other behavior that might result
from the change in retirement policies.  Note that “dissaving” means either a decrease in
saving or an increase in borrowing. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 362
(11th ed. 2004); F.H. Buckley, The Fragile Middle Class: Americans in Debt, 87 CORNELL L.
REV. 1078, 1081 (2002) (book review).
19 See Milligan, supra note 16 (noting that both parties admit there is a strain on the R
Social Security system).
20 See id.
21 Id.
22 Id. (emphasis added).
23 Steven Thomma, Personal Accounts Could Hasten Social Security Shortfall, GAO Finds,
KNIGHT RIDDER, Mar. 10, 2005, http://www.commondreams.org/headlines05/0310-02.htm
(emphasis added).
24 John F. Harris, Clinton Pledges Activist Agenda: “Save Social Security First,” President
Says; Iraq Gets Warning, WASH. POST, Jan. 28, 1998, at A1 (“‘What should we do with this
projected surplus?’  Clinton asked.  ‘I have a simple four-word answer: Save Social Security
first.’”).
25 See Jonathan Weisman, New Strategy on Social Security: With Some Risk, Bush Officials
Invoke Clinton, Moynihan, WASH. POST, Jan, 24, 2005, at A3 (“With their push to restructure
Social Security off to a rocky start, Bush administration officials have begun citing two
Democrats—former President Bill Clinton and the late senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan—
to bolster their claims that the retirement system is in crisis.”).
26 See Neil H. Buchanan, Social Security, Generational Justice, and Long-Term Deficits, 58
TAX L. REV. 275, 281–83 (2005).
27 See id. at 325–26.
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the basic structure of the Social Security system,28 although Social Se-
curity was not the focus of that article.  This Article will build upon
that earlier analysis to examine the current state of the Social Security
system from a budgetary standpoint.
In this Article, I critically examine the assumption that the Social
Security system faces a financing crisis and that the government can
avert the crisis only by acting now to cut benefits or to raise taxes.29  I
look at the Social Security system in isolation—as a program that one
can think of as meaningfully separate from the government sector’s
other fiscal activities—and as part of the aggregate taxing and spend-
ing activities of the federal government.  In isolation, the Social Secur-
ity system’s future looks surprisingly robust, with much of the current
concern about its future based on unnecessarily pessimistic economic
assumptions and a widespread failure to understand that future
changes in the proportion of retirees to workers will be more than
offset by future increases in worker productivity.30  Furthermore, if
the economy’s future path really does turn out to be worse than is
currently reasonable to expect, there will be sufficient time to make
adjustments and to keep the system solvent.
As part of the larger fiscal picture, it is possible that the govern-
ment ought to adjust even an otherwise healthy Social Security system
in the face of large deficits caused by tax cuts for the wealthy31 and the
rising costs of medical care.32  I therefore examine arguments for us-
ing Social Security to offset deficits in other sectors of the govern-
ment, and I conclude that the better policy is to leave Social Security
alone.33
28 See id. at 298–306.
29 See Soc. Sec. Admin., Social Security’s Future—FAQs, http://www.ssa.gov/qa.htm
(last visited Oct. 10, 2006).
30 See, e.g., Jonathan Weisman, Fixing Social Security No Longer the Third Rail of U.S.
Politics, SUN (BALT.), Mar. 1, 1998, at 1A (“With a smaller workforce supporting a much
larger group of retirees, worker productivity would have to increase dramatically . . . .”).  It
is unclear what “dramatically” might mean in such a context, given that even weak produc-
tivity growth would be enough to compensate for changes in the ratio of retirees to work-
ers. See infra Part I.A and note 53.
31 See Economic Outlook and Current Fiscal Issues: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the
Budget, 108th Cong. 8 (2004), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.
cgi?dbname=108_house_hearings&docid=f:92239.pdf (statement of Alan Greenspan,
Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.) (“Tax reductions . . . also contrib-
uted to the deterioration of the fiscal balance.”).
32 See Office of Mgmt. & Budget, The Nation’s Fiscal Outlook, http://www.white
house.gov/omb/budget/fy2006/outlook.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2006) (“Medicare’s
problems are compounded by the rising cost of heath care.”).
33 While I do not discuss them here, I have no objection to policy changes for Social
Security that are appropriate not because of budgetary constraints but because of changing
demographics or other reasons.  Ending the current systemic incentives to retire sooner
than a person might otherwise desire, for example, would certainly have an impact on the
system’s finances, but doing so would be good policy even if everyone agreed that the
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In short, the current political debate in the United States about
Social Security financing is wrong on two counts: politicians on a bi-
partisan basis agree that Social Security should be viewed in isola-
tion,34 and they further appear to agree that Social Security is doomed
when so viewed.35  A better approach would be to view Social Security
for accounting purposes as part of the federal government, because
doing so allows us to see the larger budgetary context within which
Social Security operates.  While adopting that viewpoint actually
strengthens the case for doom-and-gloom compared to viewing Social
Security in isolation, the best conclusion we can draw from the cur-
rent evidence is that the system is not doomed and that it is not neces-
sary to institute immediate changes.  We should, of course, continue
to monitor the situation closely to determine whether future changes
become necessary.  This conclusion is further strengthened by the
likelihood that any changes the government makes to the Social Se-
curity system today will be regressive, harming the middle class and
the least fortunate in order to forestall a crisis that may never occur or
that future progressive changes in policy will be able to address.
I
BASICS OF RETIREMENT SECURITY
A discussion of the long-term prospects of the Social Security sys-
tem must begin with a summary of the alternatives that are available to
any society that wishes to allow people to retire at some point in their
lives.  The details can vary widely, but there are a surprisingly small
number of basic issues that determine the nature of a retirement
system.36
system was in financial clover for centuries. See, e.g., Barbara A. Butrica et al., The Implicit
Tax on Work at Older Ages, 59 NAT’L TAX J. 211, 229–30 (2006) (“This study shows that Social
Security, federal taxes, and employee benefits create work disincentives for older adults.”);
Morris Shanker, Social Security Tax: Confiscatory Policy, NAT’L L.J., Oct. 11, 2006, http://
www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1160471128866 (“Our Social Security laws
should be changed to encourage, not discourage, our older workers who wish to continue
to work.”).
34 See Economics of Retirement, supra note 12, at 2 (opening statement of Sen. Gordon H. R
Smith, Chairman, Special Comm. on Aging) (“Much of the recent debate considers Social
Security in isolation from the rest of the government, the economy, and other means by
which people strive for retirement security.”).
35 Cf. Editorial, Dishonest Debate, WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 2005, at A18 (arguing that Dem-
ocrats are being disingenuous by publicly criticizing President Bush for “inventing” the
Social Security crisis, when President Bush is “taking on an issue that the Clinton adminis-
tration also regarded as important”).
36 The analysis in this section builds on my analysis in Buchanan, supra note 26, at
298–306.
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A. Workers Supporting Nonworkers: No Demographic Time
Bomb
In a world where people were literally or figuratively living inde-
pendently on their own economic islands, where all adults were at all
times responsible for providing themselves with the means of survival,
retirement would be irrelevant.  When people stopped working, they
would quickly die.37  The only way to avoid death would be to build up
a store of nonperishable goods and to secure those goods against
predators.38  This primitive form of saving would allow people to re-
tire, and it would also permit many other patterns of self-provision,
working to store up food and then drawing it down in both regular
(seasonal, cyclical, or lifetime) and irregular (sickness, leisure, or
emergency) patterns.39
In a modern economy, every person makes a small and unique
contribution to the overall output of the economy.40  Division of labor
allows workers to band together to produce larger amounts of a wider
variety of goods than they could produce without specialization or
joint efforts.41  Bricklayers lay bricks, nurses provide care to the ill,
truck drivers transport goods, and professors teach classes.  None of
those workers produces food, yet all expect that their efforts will be
sufficiently valuable to others to entitle them to a share of the food
that is produced.  Food producers, meanwhile, do not produce medi-
cal care, shelter, entertainment, or education, which makes them just
as dependent upon the rest of society for the provision of all of the
varied goods and services that they wish to consume in a given day,
month, year, or lifetime.
It is useful to keep in mind this elementary view of the economy
when analyzing retirement systems, because the core problem of how
to provide for retirement flows from these basic concepts.  Given that
everyone is dependent upon one another for almost all of the goods
and services that each person consumes, some people might consume
37 See Patricia E. Dilley, The Evolution of Entitlement: Retirement Income and the Problem of
Integrating Private Pensions and Social Security, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1063, 1086–90 (1997)
(discussing the rarity of retirement and old age prior to the modern era).
38 See Economics of Retirement, supra note 12, at 11 (statement of Alan Greenspan, Chair- R
man, Fed. Res. Bd.) (“At the most rudimentary level, one could envision households actu-
ally storing goods purchased during their working years for use during retirement.”); Paul
A. Samuelson, An Exact Consumption-Loan Model of Interest With or Without the Social Contri-
vance of Money, 66 J. POL. ECON. 467, 468 (1958) (“If there were only Robinson Crusoe, he
would hope to put by some durable goods which could be drawn on in his old age.”).
39 Cf. Samuelson, supra note 38, at 468. R
40 See ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 4–5 (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1991) (1776)
(describing the specialization of labor).
41 See id. at 4–11.
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goods even when they have not contributed to the harvest.42  Pure
charity is one such possibility; theft is another.  Retirement is a dis-
tinctly modern form of sanctioned nonwork, allowing some people to
stop working but to continue living—not by drawing down stores of
dried food in their cellars but by exercising an entitlement to con-
sume out of the rest of society’s current production.43
Children are another category of nonworking consumers whose
existence and propagation we can assume away in the Robinson Cru-
soe–style scenario I noted above.  Thus, for purposes of aggregate eco-
nomic analysis, the key issue is not how many retirees exist at any
moment but how much total consumption will be available to
nonworkers at any given time.  The greater the consumption by
nonworkers, the fewer goods and services will be available to the peo-
ple who produced them.
The economist Paul Samuelson formalized this basic insight and
popularized it into a model of “overlapping generations.”44  Samuel-
son’s model focuses on three stages in a person’s life: childhood,
work, and retirement.45  In only the middle stage does a person pro-
duce goods and services that others might wish to consume.46  As a
result, children, retirees, and others who are currently not working
depend upon those who are working for sustenance.  The total “de-
pendency ratio” is therefore defined as the number of nonworkers
divided by the number of workers.47
42 See id. at 2 (“Among civilised and thriving nations, . . . though a great number of
people do not labour at all, many of whom consume the produce of ten times, frequently
of a hundred times more labour than the greater part of those who work . . . .”).
43 See Wilma Donahue et al., Retirement: The Emerging Social Pattern, in HANDBOOK OF
SOCIAL GERONTOLOGY 330, 331 (Clark Tibbitts ed., 1960) (“Retirement is the creation of an
economically non-productive role in modern societies which are capable of supporting
large numbers of persons whose labor is not essential to the functioning of the economic
order.”).
44 Samuelson, supra note 38, at 468.
45 See id.
46 See id.  Strictly speaking, children and retirees can produce valuable services inside
the home, just as an adult who does not work for pay outside the home can produce in-
home health care services, cleaning services, food preparation services, and home mainte-
nance services.  These productive activities typically have a smaller number of potential
claimants, most of whom are in some sort of close personal relationship with the person
who actually produces them.  Therefore, ignoring such activities for the purpose of analyz-
ing a society’s aggregate support of retirement consumption is arguably appropriate.
47 See Theodore R. Marmor, How Not to Think About Medicare Reform, 26 J. HEALTH POL.
POL’Y & L. 107, 110 (2001); see, e.g., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AGE DEPENDENCY RATIO OF THE
TOTAL POPULATION: 2005, http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/GRTTable?_bm=y&-geo_
id=01000US&-_box_head_nbr=R0105&-ds_name=ACS_2005_EST_G00_&-redoLog=false&-
mt_name=ACS_2004_EST_G00_R0105_US30&-format=US-30 (last visited Nov. 27, 2006)
(“The age dependency ratio is derived by dividing the combined under-18 and 65-and-over
populations by the 18-to-64 population and multiplying by 100.”).  This official statistical
measure of dependency assumes, with a great deal of imprecision, that everyone over sixty-
four and under eighteen is non-working and that everyone aged from eighteen to sixty-
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Calculating the dependency ratio, however, is only the necessary
first step in examining the ease or difficulty with which a society’s
working population can support its nonworking population.  Worker
productivity is also essential in determining the burden that
nonworkers impose on workers.48  In 2006, the U.S. Census Bureau
categorized roughly 144 million in the United States as employed49
out of a total population of more than 300 million.50  These workers
produced approximately $13.2 trillion of gross domestic product,51
meaning that the average worker produced a bit more than $91,000
worth of goods and services during that year.  If workers in the future
produce more goods and services, they will be able to provide more
for themselves and others.52
Combining the dependency ratio with worker productivity yields
output per capita, or the average amount of goods and services availa-
ble to each person—working and nonworking—in the society.53  In
the United States in 2006, the average citizen could consume $44,000
worth of goods and services,54 though one would expect a wide range
of actual consumption, not just because of the wide disparities in in-
four is working.  Note that the age cut-offs are arbitrary.  For example, the Social Security
Trustees use twenty and sixty-four as their cut-offs for the dependency ratio. See THE 2006
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE FEDERAL OLD-AGE AND SURVIVORS INSUR-
ANCE AND FEDERAL DISABILITY INSURANCE TRUST FUNDS, H.R. DOC. NO. 109-103, at 79
tbl.V.A2 & n.1 (2006), available at http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/TR06/tr06.pdf.
48 See, e.g., Patricia E. Dilley, Taking Public Rights Private: The Rhetoric and Reality of Social
Security Privatization, 41 B.C. L. REV. 975, 992 (2000) (observing that a payroll tax is a tax on
productivity, so more productive workers generate the tax revenue that the government
distributes to nonworkers).
49 See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT SITUATION
SUMMARY tbl.A (last modified Oct. 6, 2006), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/emp-
sit.nr0.htm (showing civilian employment at above 144.3 million in July 2006).
50 U.S. Census Bureau, American FactFinder, http://factfinder.census.gov/home/
saff/main.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2006) (showing the estimated population of the
United States as 300,290,227).
51 BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, NEWS RELEASE: GROSS
DOMESTIC PRODUCT: SECOND QUARTER 2006 (FINAL); CORPORATE PROFITS: SECOND QUARTER
2006 (FINAL) 3 (2006), http://bea.gov/bea/newsrelarchive/2006/gdp206f.pdf (“Current-
dollar GDP—the market value of the nation’s output of goods and services—increased . . .
in the second quarter to a level of $13,197.3 billion.”).
52 See Marmor, supra note 47, at 110 (“What we have as burdens depends, in short, on
what else we are supporting.”); cf. Jonathan Barry Forman, How Federal Pension Laws Influ-
ence Individual Work and Retirement Decisions, 54 TAX LAW. 143, 146–47 (2000) (discussing
the problem of decreasing the numbers of workers relative to retirees and arguing that the
solution lies in extending the working lives of Americans).
53 For these purposes, it is not directly the dependency ratio that matters but the ratio
of all members of society (working and nonworking) to those who are working, which is
simply the dependency ratio plus one.  Then, per-capita output can be computed simply by
dividing worker productivity (output per worker) by the ratio of all citizens to workers
(people per worker).
54 This figure is based on dividing $13.2 trillion by 300 million people.
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comes55 but even within families.  If the dependency ratio were to rise,
productivity would have to rise sufficiently to make it possible to offset
the larger number of dependents per worker.  As long as the change
in output per capita is positive, worker productivity will grow faster
than any change in dependency.
In fact, projections for the U.S. economy do predict consistent
annual increases in output per capita.56  Indeed, using even the pessi-
mistic assumptions in the Trustees’ “high cost” scenario, real GDP will
grow at least one percent per year through 2080, while the U.S. popu-
lation is projected to grow at a rate of less than two-tenths of one per-
cent annually, meaning that output per worker will grow
approximately eight-tenths of one percent per year.  Compounded
over a seventy-five-year period, even such a seemingly low annual rate
of increase results in a total increase in average per capita income of
eighty percent.57  Moreover, I am unaware of any longer-term fore-
casts of output per capita that are negative.  In other words, no fore-
caster is so pessimistic about the interaction of future population
growth and future productivity growth that they predict that output
per capita will go down.
Any concern, therefore, that impending demographic changes
must inevitably lead to smaller average amounts of goods and services
to be shared among a growing number of retirees and a shrinking
number of workers is misplaced.  There are certainly other issues wor-
thy of concern, but the aggregate picture is still very positive.  Both
workers and nonworkers can thus enjoy higher material living stan-
dards in the future even though there will be, relatively, more
nonworkers to support.
55 See James H. Moore Jr., Projected Pension Income: Equality or Disparity for the Baby-Boom
Cohort?, MONTHLY LAB. REV., March 2006, at 59 (“[P]ension eligibility and income have
historically been unequally distributed.”).
56 See H.R. DOC. NO. 109-103, at 95 tbl.V.B2 (2006), available at http://www.ssa.gov/
OACT/TR/TR06/tr06.pdf (forecasting long-term annual growth rates of real GDP after
2015 of at least 1% for high-cost assumptions); id at 79 tbl.V.A2 (showing, under the pessi-
mistic high-cost scenario, the population increasing from 323,277 in 2015 to 354,301 in
2080—an annual rate of increase of less than two-tenths of 1%); cf. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE,
THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: AN UPDATE 63 tbl.C-2 (2006), http://mir-
ror2.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/74xx/doc7492/08-17-BudgetUpdate.pdf (showing annual rates of
change of real GDP between 3.4% and 2.5% from 2006 through 2016).
57 This estimate is actually even more pessimistic than the high-cost assumptions
would suggest, because the high-cost assumptions include GDP growth rates above 1% for
all but seventeen years in the seventy-five-year projection range.  Using the GDP growth
rates in the high-cost assumptions, per capita GDP more than doubles, rising by 131% in
2080.  In the intermediate scenario, per capita income more than triples (rising by 225%),
while in the low-cost scenario, per capita income more than quadruples (rising by 342%).
See H.R. DOC. NO. 109-103, at 94–95 tbl.V.B2 (2006); id. at 78–79 tbl.V.A2, available at
http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/TR06/tr06.pdf.  Computations by author available upon
request.
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The lesson from this review of the evidence and basic growth the-
ory is that the United States does not face a retirement crisis.  Higher
living standards for all are possible.  The question is whether the U.S.
system of financing retirement is currently set up to allow the goods
and services produced now and in the future to flow to both workers
and nonworkers without creating a financial crisis.
B. Prefunded and PAYGO Retirement Systems and Just Deserts
The discussion above describes what one might call a “real view”
of retirement, abstracting from financial issues to describe retirement
as a variation on the timeless concept of an economy where some peo-
ple consume goods and services but do not work to help produce
them.  What matters in the real view is whether the workers are pro-
ducing enough goods and services to allow everyone, including the
nonworkers, to enjoy an acceptable material standard of living.
A complementary analysis, which I will call the “financial view” of
retirement, would recognize that even where—as in the United
States—there is no trend toward a shrinking pie from which more
people will be taking slices, retirement systems must nevertheless co-
ordinate the allocation of goods and services among workers and
nonworkers.  Absent a command economy,58 the alternatives are what
I shall refer to as “prefunded” retirement systems (in which retire-
ment benefits are paid out of accumulated savings balances) and “pay
as you go” retirement systems (or “PAYGO” systems, in which benefits
are paid out of current workers’ payroll taxes).59  As I discuss below,
the similarities between these two methods of financing are arguably
as important as their differences.
A “prefunded” retirement system in its purest form is simply indi-
vidual saving.  By some standards, private saving does not constitute a
“retirement system” at all, because one need not undertake private
saving solely for purposes of retirement; also, such a system has no
separate financing or governance mechanisms commonly associated
with retirement plans.60  Still, if enforceable contractual mechanisms
58 See Kevin Trost, Note, Russia’s Federal Law on Advertising: Permanent Solution or Provi-
sional Stopgap?, 16 WIS. INT’L L.J. 529, 532 n.31 (1998) (“A command economy is where the
state directs and controls all production, distribution, and sale of goods; no private
industry.”).
59 Cf. LAURENCE S. SEIDMAN, FUNDING SOCIAL SECURITY: A STRATEGIC ALTERNATIVE 19
(2006) (using the terms “PAYGO” and “funded” to describe Social Security funding alter-
natives).  This use of the term PAYGO should not be confused with the budgetary rule of
the same name that “compels new spending or tax changes to not add to the federal defi-
cit.”  C-SPAN Congressional Glossary, http://www.c-span.org/guide/congress/glossary/
paygo.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2006).
60 Cf. Joseph F. Quinn, Social Security on the Table, AM. PROSPECT, May 1, 1996, available
at http://www.prospect.org/web/page.ww?section=root&name=ViewPrint&articleId=4926
(describing the financing and governance mechanisms associated with Social Security).
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enable workers to spend less than they earn in order to have money to
spend after they stop working, such a regime constitutes a retirement
system.  A government may also create a separate legal regime with its
own set of rules for retirement savings, which creates a subset of sav-
ings accounts that one can explicitly think of as retirement savings.
The key here is that a savings account (which may come in differ-
ent forms, such as bonds or mutual funds) is a recognized legal ar-
rangement that contractually binds the saver and the borrower.61  The
agreement’s basic form is as follows: a saver agrees not to buy as many
goods and services as the saver could currently buy and gives the bor-
rower the power to buy goods and services that the borrower did not
produce; in return, the borrower will provide the saver with the legal
entitlement to buy goods and services in the future that the saver did
not produce.  This admittedly stilted description of the logic of the
classic lending arrangement is helpful in understanding the funda-
mental similarity between prefunded and PAYGO retirement systems.
In a prefunded retirement system, nonworkers draw upon their
retirement savings to purchase the goods and services that they con-
sume while not working.  Nonworkers “deserve” to consume those
goods in the sense that they abstained from consuming all that they
could have consumed while working, allowing others to consume what
they did not consume; in retirement, the former workers are simply
asking that their savings contract be enforced.62  Current workers
have no right to object that the current retirees did not produce the
goods that they now consume because the retirees have the legally
protected right to buy goods by withdrawing funds from deposit
accounts.
In a PAYGO retirement system, retirees have also earned the right
to consume goods that they did not produce.63  That right is not me-
morialized in a bank statement but in the right to receive periodic
payments from the government (or another designated entity), with
which the retiree may purchase goods and services.64  As in a
prefunded retirement system, current workers in a PAYGO system
have no basis on which to claim that retirees may not receive these
61 See Suburban Bank of Hoffman-Schaumburg v. Bousis, 578 N.E.2d 935, 941 (Ill.
1991) (indicating that a savings account forms a binding contractual agreement).
62 See Robert C. Atchley, Retirement: Leaving the World of Work, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL.
& SOC. SCI., Nov. 1982, at 121 (“Retirement is the withdrawal of an individual from employ-
ment, along with entitlement to income that is based on having been employed over a
period of years.”).
63 See Rick Santorum, Wealth Creation in the New Millenium: Transforming Poverty in
America, 16 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 383, 388 (2002) (describing the PAYGO
system as “an intergenerational income transfer program where current workers contrib-
ute FICA/payroll taxes that go directly to fund benefits of current retirees and other
beneficiaries”).
64 See id.
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payments, because during the time that the retirees were working,
they received reduced pay and restricted their consumption to allow
nonworkers to consume.65
Admittedly, retirees in a PAYGO system might receive larger or
smaller payments than anticipated should the government increase or
decrease their benefit payments.  Such a scenario, however, is also
possible in a prefunded system: participants in a prefunded system
might find that they can purchase more (or fewer) goods than they
anticipated because their retirement savings accounts pay higher (or
lower) returns.
Therefore, the notion that only persons in a prefunded system
deserve—or have earned—their postretirement consumption is
purely artificial.  In both systems, the right to consume is at least par-
tially based on a retiree’s underconsumption during his or her work-
ing life.  A PAYGO system does not directly equate market returns
with “just deserts,” whereas a prefunded system implicitly bases the
right to consume in retirement on abstention from consumption
while working and on whether a retiree’s savings accounts—assuming
they still exist—pay relatively high interest rates.66
The key to both the prefunded and PAYGO systems is the speed
of economic growth, if any, between the time that a person works and
the time the person retires.  If the economy grows rapidly during that
period, it will be relatively easy to provide increasingly large amounts
of goods and services for both workers and nonworkers.  If the econ-
omy grows less rapidly, on the other hand, the provision of those
goods and services will become more difficult.  In a prefunded system,
slow growth generally means lower financial returns on retirement ac-
counts, leading to lower consumption potential during retirement.  In
a PAYGO system, slow growth intensifies the conflict between workers
and nonworkers as the retirement system’s tax and benefit structure
are adjusted over time.
The difference between prefunded and PAYGO systems, there-
fore, depends on the decisions that dictate the entitlements earned by
nonconsumption.  Prefunded systems are based on the political deci-
sions that determine the rules by which retirement accounts are cre-
ated and protected from risk, if at all.  PAYGO systems are based on
political decisions in setting tax and benefit formulas on an ongoing
basis.  One might prefer one set of political decisions to the other, but
65 Cf. id. (“When today’s workers reach retirement, they in turn will expect to-
morrow’s workers to contribute taxes sufficient to fund their promised benefits.”).
66 Cf. Leigh Allyson Wolfe, Is Your Pension Safe? A Call for Reform of the Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation and Protection of Pension Benefits, 24 SW. U. L. REV. 145, 164 (1994)
(“Implicit in prefunding pension benefits is that a variety of assumptions must be made . . .
includ[ing assumptions about future] interest rate[s].”).
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both systems are inherently political.67  As such, participants in both
systems can reasonably claim the moral right to consume during re-
tirement under the rules of their respective systems.
C. The Trust Funds
Moving from the conceptual and moral issues of retirement fund-
ing to the current policy framework, the current retirement system in
the United States is designed as a PAYGO system.68  The system forces
current workers to consume less than they otherwise would,69 but no
individual accounts exist for workers to monitor and determine ongo-
ing funding levels.  Instead, they simply earn the right to future bene-
fits under the rules of the system.
In what economists call a long-term steady state, the U.S. system
would be perfectly in balance every year.70  Population change, retire-
ment rates, productivity growth, and all other relevant economic and
demographic variables would move along smooth and predictable
paths.71  In such a system, one could easily set tax and benefit formu-
las such that the anticipated worker revenue exactly equals the antici-
pated retiree benefits.72  Such a system would not need to borrow or
collect extra funds because the money entering the system would, by
design, equal the money paid out.
Such a financial balance is possible even when the economy is not
on a smooth path.  One could design a PAYGO system such that the
annual revenues come as close as possible to covering annual benefits.
Depending on the volatility of the key demographic and economic
variables, financial balance could require significant and frequent
changes in the retirement system’s tax and benefit formulas.
In the early 1980s, the United States faced just such a significant
change in a key demographic variable.73  The youngest members of
the Baby Boom generation were then moving into the workforce, and
the oldest members of that generation were approximately thirty years
67 See, e.g., Eric M. Patashnik, 29 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 1235, 1236–37 (2004)
(book review) (discussing some of the political implications of Social Security
privatization).
68 See, e.g., Santorum, supra note 63, at 388.
69 See Buchanan, supra note 26, at 300 (explaining that retirees are able to consume
goods that they have not produced because workers consume “less than they otherwise
could purchase”).
70 See ANDREW B. ABEL & BEN S. BERNANKE, MACROECONOMICS 224 (5th ed. 2005).
71 See id.
72 With all variables changing in predictable patterns, tax and benefit rates could reli-
ably be set each year to produce annual balance.
73 For a brief summary of the recent history of the Social Security system, see Neil H.
Buchanan, The Trillion-Dollar Breach of Contract: Social Security and the American Worker (Aug.
30, 2001), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20010830_buchanan.html [herein-
after Contract]; see also Buchanan, supra note 26, at 300–01.
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from retirement.74  Looking forward to the time when the Baby
Boomers would begin retiring, many politicians grew concerned
about the very long-term financing challenges that the retirement of
such a large cohort would create.75
One possible response to this concern would be to treat it not as a
problem but as the background against which to set tax and benefit
formulas.  As previously noted, it would not have been difficult to set
policy such that the system would take in no more money in a given
year than it would pay out.76  During the years the Baby Boomers were
in the workforce, this would have involved some combination of
higher benefits for the Boomers’ retired parents and lower taxes for
the Boomers.  Upon the retirement of the Baby Boomers, the system
would have required lower benefit payments for Boomers and higher
taxes for the relatively small cohort of people then working.
This option would have required rather dramatic shifts in tax and
benefit formulas over the span of a few decades.  Most likely con-
cerned about the political conflict that such large (and unfavorable)
changes would create during the Boomers’ retirement, Congress
changed the Social Security system in 1983 so that it would balance,
not yearly, but over a much longer time period.77  This required the
system to collect more funds over the following several decades than it
would pay out, which in turn required an accounting of the excess
funds that it would accumulate during that time.  The system thus
started to accumulate large balances in the Trust Funds.78
Given the near universality of the Social Security system, the Trust
Funds superficially resemble large savings accounts held in the name
of the Social Security system on behalf of nearly all citizens.79  The
question, of course, was where to “deposit” such large amounts of sav-
ings.  If the government deposited the annual surpluses in private fi-
nancial markets, it would directly tie the performance of the Trust
74 See Contract, supra note 73.
75 See id.; see also John A. Svahn & Mary Ross, Social Security Amendments of 1983: Legisla-
tive History and Summary of Provisions, 46 SOC. SEC. BULL. 3, 5 (1983) (“[I]n 1981, when the
97th Congress convened and the Reagan administration took office, Social Security financ-
ing issuers were a major concern.”).
76 See supra text accompanying note 72.
77 See Svahn & Ross, supra note 75, at 43–44 & tbls.2, 3 & 4.
78 It is common to refer to the Trust Funds in the plural, referring to the Old-Age and
Survivors Insurance (OASI) trust fund and the Disability Insurance (DI) trust fund, which
together represent the net financial position of the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability In-
surance Program (OASDI). See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 56, at 1.
79 In fact, many directly analogize the Social Security system to a system of savings
accounts. See Judd Gregg & Charles Blahous, Policy Essay, Mobilizing the Marketplace to Re-
new American Productivity: A Program for the Twenty-First Century, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 63, 77
(1998).
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Funds to market rates of return.80  This would also mean, of course,
that the government was in the position of holding large quantities of
private financial instruments.
Because the federal government is, in the aggregate, a net bor-
rower on the financial markets, there was an alternative strategy availa-
ble.81  Congress finances annual deficits by having the Treasury issue
bonds to private lenders and repay those bonds with interest upon
maturity.82  If the Social Security system was collecting more revenue
than it was distributing, the federal government could use the surplus
to reduce its annual borrowing.
In 2005, for example, the Trust Funds ran a surplus of $173 bil-
lion83 while the rest of the federal government ran a deficit of $491
billion.84  The federal government as a whole thus ran a deficit of
$318 billion.85  If the Trust Funds had loaned $173 billion to private
borrowers while the Treasury borrowed $491 billion to finance its
shortfall on non–Social Security operations, the net effect of the gov-
ernment on the private financial markets would have been the same.
Therefore, the Trust Funds are simply “invested” directly in Treasury
securities.86  The total balance of the Trust Funds at the end of 2005
was $1,858.7 billion, representing the accumulated value of all previ-
ous Trust Fund surpluses, plus interest.87
This positive balance in the Trust Funds means that when the
Social Security system reaches the point at which it collects less in a
given year than it pays out in benefits, it must order the Treasury to
procure extra funds on Social Security’s behalf.88  The Treasury will
do so from a surplus, if one exists, or, if one does not, by borrowing
on the private financial markets.89  As long as a positive balance in the
Trust Funds persists, the Treasury has no choice but to honor the re-
80 Cf. Regina T. Jefferson, Privatization: Not the Answer for Social Security Reform, 58
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1287, 1297 (2001) (“[R]estrictions on the investment of the trust fund
assets protect them from the volatility of the private market; however, they also cause the
funds to experience relatively low rates of investment return.”).
81 See BUREAU OF THE PUBLIC DEBT, U.S DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, THE DEBT TO THE
PENNY, http://www.publicdebt.treas.gov/opd/opdpenny.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2006)
(providing current debt calculations).
82 See Bureau of the Public Debt, The Basics of Treasury Securities, http://
www.publicdebt.treas.gov/of/ofbasics.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2006).
83 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 56, at 2 tbl.1-1.
84 See id. (showing a Postal Service surplus of $2 billion and an on-budget deficit of
$493 billion).
85 See id.
86 See Social Security Online, Trust Fund FAQs, http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/
ProgData/fundFAQ.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2006).
87 See H.R. DOC. NO. 109-103, at 4 tbl.II.B1 (2006), available at http://www.ssa.gov/
OACT/TR/TR06/tr06.pdf.
88 See Social Security Online, supra note 86 (explaining that one of the purposes of
the Trust Funds is to “provide automatic spending authority”).
89 See id.
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quest for money.90  If no money remains in the Trust Funds, Social
Security must either do without or secure additional funds through an
explicit act of Congress.91
D. Are the Trust Funds “Real”?
It is crucial to note that the Trust Funds are both an accounting
fiction and the product of an actual decision on the part of policymak-
ers.  The Trust Funds have accumulated balances because workers pay
higher Social Security taxes than necessary if the goal were simply to
run an annual balance.92  To say that the Trust Funds are invested in
Treasury securities means simply that the Social Security system’s sur-
pluses have allowed the federal government to borrow less money
from private parties than it otherwise would have in the absence of the
Trust Funds.93  This difference can be extremely confusing and has
led to serious political consequences.
One useful comparison is to the question of whether a paper dol-
lar is in fact worth anything.  Because modern economies no longer
operate under a gold standard (or any other commodity-based stan-
dard), U.S. currency is not backed by any precious metal or item of
nonarbitrary value.94  In that sense, the dollar is not backed by any-
thing “real.”  This fact, however, does not mean that people are fool-
ish to hold onto paper currency.  People know that even fiat
currency—currency backed by nothing more than a government’s full
faith and credit95—has value.  Promises mean something, and the
economy would stagger to a halt if the public stopped believing in the
value of dollars.
Social Security’s Trust Funds are also backed by the full faith and
credit of the U.S. government.96  This backing is more than mere
words.  The Trust Funds’ assets are Treasury bonds, which are en-
forceable legal obligations by which the federal government promises
to repay its lenders.97  While parties often breach their contractual
90 See id.
91 See id. (noting that when the assets of the OASI trust fund were nearly depleted in
1982, Congress enacted emergency legislation that permitted borrowing from other trust
funds).
92 See Paul Krugman, Confusions About Social Security, 2 ECONOMISTS’ VOICE 1, 1–3
(2005), http://www.bepress.com/ev/vol2/iss1/art1.
93 See Social Security Online, supra note 86; see also Contract, supra note 73.
94 See, e.g., Kenneth W. Dam, From the Gold Clause Cases to the Gold Commission: A Half
Century of American Monetary Law, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 504, 504 (1983).
95 See William Mitchell & Martin Watts, Symposium, Centre of Full Employment & Equity
9 (Ctr. of Full Employment and Equity, Working Paper No. 04-05, 2004), available at http:/
/pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/58738/20060518/e1.newcastle.edu.au/coffee/pubs/wp/2004/
04-05.pdf (“The government is the sole provider of fiat currency or money.”).
96 See Social Security Online, supra note 86.
97 See id.
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obligations, Treasury bonds are a uniquely powerful promise because
the U.S. government puts its full faith and credit behind its debts.98
Putting one’s trust in Treasury bonds is hardly a sign of financial na-
ivete´: financial managers and economists treat Treasury bonds as risk-
free.99  Indeed, Treasuries are the gold standard of risk-free assets
against which to compare all other financial assets.100  The value of
the accounting entries in the Trust Funds is thus ultimately based on
the government’s commitment not to default on the most trusted fi-
nancial instrument in human history.
In 1983, the government could have guaranteed its promise to
pay future Social Security benefits in a number of ways.  For instance,
it could have passed a law with a supermajority requirement that
would allow future legislative minorities to block changes in the law.
On the other hand, it could have simply included a passage in the
statute to the effect that “future Congresses should take note of the
promises made here.”  The method that the government settled on,
however, was in some ways the most powerful guarantee available: It
made the promises in the form of Treasury bonds.  Promises can be
broken, but never the promises that the Treasury bonds embody.  The
Trust Funds represent an automatic appropriation of funds for Social
Security benefits during the years when, entirely by design, the system
will collect less annually in taxes than it pays out in benefits.101
II
SOCIAL SECURITY IN ISOLATION: THE LONG-TERM TRUST
FUND BALANCE
The Social Security system is frequently treated as if it were sepa-
rate from the rest of the federal government.102  The system’s dedi-
cated financing mechanism (i.e., payroll-tax withholding) makes it
easy to measure whether the inflows and outflows of the system are
98 See, e.g., U.S. Treasury, Statement of Secretary John W. Snow on Debt Limit (Mar.
16, 2006), http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/js4123.htm (“I commend Congress for
protecting the full faith and credit of the United States with today’s action on the debt
limit.  This legislation ensures that the U.S. can deliver on promises already made, such as
Social Security and Medicare payments and aid for the victims of the 2005 hurricanes.”).
99 See, e.g., TIA-CREF Brokerage Services Investment Glossary, http://www.tiaa-cref-
brokerage.com/invest_glosry_GoGq.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2006) (defining Treasury
bonds as “the most credit-worthy of all debt instruments”).
100 See id.
101 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM: ANSWERS TO KEY
QUESTIONS 26 (2005), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05193sp.pdf (“[B]enefit costs will
exceed income in 2017 . . . .  Starting in 2017, the Treasury Department will begin to
redeem trust fund securities in order to continue to pay full promised benefits.”).
102 See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE supra note 56, at 2 tbl.1-1 (listing separately the
federal government deficit and the Social Security surplus); see also Krugman, supra note
92, at 2 (discussing the internal inconsistencies resulting from viewing Social Security
separately).
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currently balanced and to forecast whether they will be balanced in
the future.103
This entire exercise, however, is rather odd for governmental ac-
counting.  Most activities of government are financed out of general
funds,104 making the question whether any particular program is “in
balance” nonsensical.  For example, the Department of Homeland Se-
curity does not issue an annual balance sheet telling citizens whether
its revenues and expenditures are in balance.105  The department has
no revenues of its own, so such an exercise is impossible.106
Social Security, however, can be put to such a balancing test.  Al-
though it seems somewhat arbitrary to hold Social Security to this
standard without doing the same for other government programs,
perhaps the very elements that make Social Security so enduringly
popular—its universality, its appearance of making meaningful guar-
antees to workers—also justify making the program self-financing.  If
so, it becomes rather difficult to justify the deliberate running of sur-
pluses in the system that began in 1983, because doing so meant that
the system was being used for more than its inherent purpose.  Either
we should treat Social Security as a separate entity unrelated to the
rest of the government, or we should recognize that it is just another
government program.  Treating it as a piggy bank for several decades
and then refusing to replace the money when it is needed seems
highly opportunistic.
Rather than opportunism, however, this might be a matter of rad-
ically changed circumstances.  With Social Security surpluses set to dis-
appear very soon, it might be regrettable but necessary to recognize
that we can no longer pretend that Social Security is a separate entity.
Promises made in 1983 might simply no longer be realistic in 2007,
2040, or 2080.  Appeals to contract-like commitments that span de-
cades might simply not be the best way to analyze the system’s current
and future health.
There is, however, a noncontractarian argument in favor of treat-
ing the system as a separate entity.  Specifically, if we do not treat So-
cial Security as separate, there is no principled basis for setting the tax
103 This is, in fact, the point of issuing the annual Trustees’ Reports, which focus on
the financial condition of the Social Security system as a unique entity and not simply as
one part of the federal government’s fiscal operations. See H.R. DOC. NO. 109-103 (2006),
available at http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/TR06/tr06.pdf (reporting updates on the So-
cial Security system as a separate entity independent from other government systems and
agencies).
104 See, e.g., EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., BUDGET OF THE U.S.
GOV’T, FISCAL YEAR 2007, at 341, available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy07/
pdf/spec.pdf.
105 See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., BUDGET-IN-BRIEF, FISCAL YEAR 2007, at 5, available
at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/Budget_BIB-FY2007.pdf.
106 See id.
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and benefit formulas of the system.  Treating Social Security as part of
the general fiscal mix means that Social Security taxes and benefits
need not be set with reference to each other at all.  In addition, it is
not obvious how to set the tax and benefit levels when those decisions
will simply be one of many inputs into the overall fiscal balance or
imbalance.
Moreover, once Social Security’s fiscal elements are viewed simply
as part of the aggregate fiscal mix, questions arise as to whether we
should replace payroll taxes with wealth or inheritance taxes, or vice
versa.  The benefit of the current arrangement is that it takes some
choices off the table and constrains other choices in ways that might
make policymaking more understandable.
Viewing certain choices as out-of-bounds, of course, does not
mean that we are not making choices.  If we decide that Social Secur-
ity’s tax and benefit levels must be related to each other in some
mechanical way (annual balance, cyclical balance, long-term balance),
and if we decide that the tax base is labor income, then we are decid-
ing not to set levels by any other formula and not to use a different tax
base.  While as a matter of political expediency it might be useful to
pretend otherwise, pretending does not change reality.
For the remainder of Part II, I will treat Social Security as a sepa-
rate entity.  When Social Security is so viewed, the question becomes
whether it is financially sound as currently structured.  I conclude not
only that it is in good condition when viewed from this perspective,
but that even a long-term imbalance in Social Security’s financial con-
dition would simply force changes that are manageable and even ac-
ceptable.  In Part III of this Article, I examine whether treating Social
Security as one (rather large) part of the federal budget changes the
conclusions of the analysis.
A. Long-Term Balance and Imbalance
As previously noted, the 1983 plan for the Social Security Trust
Funds entailed a departure from a plan by which the system balanced
intake and outflow every year and instead attempted to create a much
longer-term balance.107  During the years in which the Baby Boom co-
hort was working, the Baby Boomers would pay higher taxes than nec-
essary, with the surplus being memorialized in the Trust Funds, which
would accumulate interest at the same rate at which private holders of
Treasury bonds earn interest.108  When the Baby Boomers began to
retire, the annual surpluses would start to disappear and then turn
107 See supra Part I.C.
108 See Contract, supra note 73.
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into annual deficits.109  The deficits would not be a sign of fiscal dis-
tress but rather an inevitable part of the plan.
This plan thus implied that there would be four phases for Social
Security’s finances.  During the first phase, as Baby Boomers entered
their prime earning years, Social Security would have growing sur-
pluses.  During the second phase, the surpluses would still exist but
would start to shrink, as the oldest Baby Boomers stopped working
and started to collect benefits.  At some point, the system would cross
the threshold to the third phase, in which the system would run defi-
cits that became larger with each year.  Finally, the fourth phase would
show annual deficits in the system shrinking toward zero, eventually
returning to annual balance after the Baby Boomers had all moved
through the system to their final rest.  Although the plan logically sug-
gests these four phases, the discussion among both politicians and pol-
icy analysts has focused on the end of the second phase, the point at
which surpluses turn to deficits, and the point at which the Trust
Funds are depleted.110
With such a carefully balanced plan that would take place over
many decades, it became important to monitor the system to ensure
that it would be reasonably on track to meet its targets.111  The annual
Trustees’ reports thus describe the ongoing experience of the system,
assessing on an annual basis whether the paths of revenues and ex-
penditures will meet at the appropriate date in the future.112  The an-
nual reports provide three sets of projections: intermediate, low-cost,
and high-cost.113  The intermediate projections “reflect the Trustees’
best estimates of future experience,” whereas the low-cost calculations
represent a relatively optimistic estimation, and the high-cost calcula-
tions represent a very pessimistic estimation.114
Social Security is currently running large annual surpluses, with
the 2005 surplus measured at $171.8 billion.115  According to the
Trustees’ intermediate estimates, the first phase, of growing surpluses,
109 See id.
110 See, e.g., Karen Tumulty & Eric Roston, Social Security: Is There Really a Crisis?, TIME,
Jan. 24, 2005, at 22.  Interestingly, the political discussion has ignored the transition from
the first phase to the second phase.  While it would be possible to declare a crisis at the
point where Social Security’s ability to finance part of the overall deficit starts to decline, I
am unaware of anyone having made that argument.  The two dates of interest are the first
year of deficits and the year of trust-fund depletion. See H.R. DOC. NO. 109-103, at 2–3
(2006), available at http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/TR06/tr06.pdf.
111 See 42 U.S.C. § 401(c) (2000) (creating the Board of Trustees to oversee the Trust
Funds).
112 See 42 U.S.C. § 401(c)(2) (2000) (creating the duty of the Board of Trustees to
report to Congress the current and expected future performance of the Trust Funds).
113 See H.R. DOC. NO. 109-103, at 6 (2006), available at http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/
TR/TR06/tr06.pdf.
114 Id.
115 See id. at 37 tbl.IV.A3.
\\server05\productn\C\CRN\92-2\CRN204.txt unknown Seq: 22 26-DEC-06 15:44
278 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:257
will end in 2013,116 at which point Social Security will quickly run
through the second phase, of shrinking surpluses, and will begin to
run annual deficits after 2017.117  Under the high-cost assumptions,
deficits begin in 2013,118 while under the low-cost assumptions, defi-
cits do not begin until 2022.119
The Trustees do not distinguish between the third and fourth
phases, noting that their intermediate projections show that the Trust
Funds will be depleted in 2040.120  The high-cost scenario estimates
depletion of the Trust Funds in 2030.121  Significantly, in the low-cost
scenario, the Trust Funds are never depleted through 2080.122
Given the dramatic differences in the projected depletion dates
of the Trust Funds in the three scenarios,123 the differences among
those scenarios are important.  The Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) provides its own estimates of the long-term health of Social
Security and, significantly, its intermediate estimates are much less
dire than the Trustees’ intermediate forecasts.124
It is not the goal of this Article to resolve the differences between
the two agencies’ estimations.  However, it is at least imaginable that
these differences reflect the Trustees’ desires to produce more pessi-
mistic assumptions than warranted.125  Indeed, it might be true that
the Social Security “deficit is in fact nonexistent . . . [and] was arrived
at by violating professional actuarial practice standards resulting from
the politicized trustees having final say over projection assumptions of
the actuaries, much as Enron prevailed on its accountants to ignore
accounting standards.”126
Even if there are no political motives at play, the trustees’ estima-
tions do appear to be unduly gloomy:
[T]here is a strong case to be made that the [trustees are] erring on
the side of being overly pessimistic. . . .  Over a recent 10-year span,
the trustees’ intermediate guesses turned out to be quite pessimis-
116 See id.
117 See id. at 43 tbl.IV.B1.
118 See id. at 44 tbl.IV.B1.
119 See id.
120 See id. at 52 tbl.IV.B3.
121 See id.
122 See id.
123 See id.
124 See Buchanan, supra note 26, at 304 (discussing the 2005 mid-range estimation of
the CBO); see also CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, UPDATED LONG-TERM PROJECTIONS FOR SOCIAL
SECURITY 4 (2006), http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/72xx/doc7289/06-14-LongTermProjec-
tions.pdf (estimating a mid-range exhaustion date of 2046).
125 See David Langer, Letter to the Editor, Social Security Tricks, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 22,
2002, at A10 (letter from the chairman of Employee Benefits Committee, Actuarial Society
of Greater New York).
126 Id.
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tic.  Its optimistic guesses were dead on, and its pessimistic case—
sort of a doomsday situation—was wildly inaccurate.127
Except as noted below,128 I will, however, treat the Trustees’ in-
termediate scenario as if it provided the best available estimates.
B. Does Trust Fund Depletion Mean Anything, Really?
If the Trust Funds are never depleted, then there is no cause for
alarm.  In the event that the Trust Funds are depleted in the year
before the system returned to annual balance,129 the ultimate demise
of the last Baby Boomer would be macroeconomically unimportant.
This is due to the fact that in the years preceding the Trust Funds’
depletion, the annual borrowing necessitated by the Social Security
system would gradually shrink to nothing so that the year-to-year
change would be smooth and uneventful.130
If the Trust Funds really will be depleted by 2040,131 the outlook
is rather different.  In the year before depletion, the Trust Funds
would run a substantial deficit, requiring the Treasury to cover that
deficit with its own borrowing if it could not cover it with a surplus in
the rest of the budget.132  However, as soon as the Trust Funds are
depleted, the Social Security system would be forced to run a bal-
anced annual budget immediately.133  While this would be a jolt to the
Social Security system (absent a highly likely correction by Congress
by that time), the jolt would be positive for the overall deficit.  The
depletion of the Trust Funds would, in a very real sense, require an
immediate cut in government expenditures because the Social Secur-
ity system would be forced to run an annual balance between expendi-
tures and revenues.  Assuming that the cut in expenditures would not
create a recession, the overall budget would then show a smaller
deficit.
127 Roger Lowenstein, A Question of Numbers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2005, § 6 (Magazine),
at 40.
128 See infra note 149 and accompanying text (discussing a hypothetical involving the
low-cost scenario).
129 In fact, the system was deliberately devised to function in such a manner. See
Buchanan, supra note 26, at 301–02.
130 See id. at 301–03.
131 See H.R. DOC. NO. 109-103, at 52 tbl.IV.B3 (2006), available at http://www.ssa.gov/
OACT/TR/TR06/tr06.pdf.
132 See OFFICE OF ECON. POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, SOCIAL SECURITY AND
MEDICARE TRUST FUNDS AND THE FEDERAL BUDGET 12 (2006), available at http://
www.treas.gov/offices/economic-policy/reports/budget_trust_fund_perspectives_2006.
pdf (illustrating the effect of a deficit in the Trust Funds on the federal budget).
133 See H.R. DOC. NO. 109-103, at 16 (2006), available at http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/
TR/TR06/tr06.pdf (discussing the extensive changes that would be necessary to bring So-
cial Security out of deficit after exhausting the Trust Funds).
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The effect of the federal government’s fiscal decisions on the fu-
ture growth of the economy is not directly tied to the Trust Funds.
The government’s net borrowing can lead to “crowding out” of pri-
vate investment, which can decrease future levels of output,134 and
reductions in the government’s net borrowing can thus reduce crowd-
ing out and raise future living standards.135  Except in the year when
the Trust Funds are depleted, though, the annual change in the defi-
cit due to the Social Security system will be relatively mild as the sys-
tem moves smoothly toward a zero balance in the Trust Funds.136
From the standpoint of future retirees, however, the depletion of
the Trust Funds could be significant.  The Social Security system
would not be forced to shut down, of course, because the system
would continue to collect taxes each year.137  The system would, how-
ever, be forced to reduce benefits to the point where they were equal
to total tax revenues.  How much of a reduction would be necessary?
“Present tax rates would be sufficient to pay 74 percent of scheduled
benefits after Trust Funds exhaustion in 2040 and 70 percent of
scheduled benefits in 2080.”138  Although a reduction in future bene-
fits of twenty-six to thirty percent is significant,139 the reduction is less
dramatic when one considers that those future benefits are quite high
compared with benefit levels today.  Indeed, in a 2006 report, the
CBO notes that “CBO’s projections of benefit levels indicate that fu-
ture beneficiaries will receive higher retirement benefits—and pay
higher Social Security taxes—than current beneficiaries do.”140
Even if the future cuts in benefits do not result in any generation
of beneficiaries doing worse than its predecessors, it is plausible that
such a sudden change could be politically problematic.141  If so, it
might be wise to prevent such a one-time shock to the system.  How-
ever, this necessarily implies that in order to shield the current gener-
ation’s progeny—who are projected to have higher real living
standards both before and during retirement than current genera-
134 See Alan S. Blinder, Is the National Debt Really—I Mean, Really—a Burden?, in DEBT
AND THE TWIN DEFICITS DEBATE 209, 219 (James M. Rock ed., 1991).
135 See id. at 219, 224.
136 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 124, at 12 fig.1-2 (showing the smooth path of
the OASDI Trust Fund Ratio before and after reaching zero balance).
137 See H.R. DOC. NO. 109-103, at 8 (2006), available at http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/
TR/TR06/tr06.pdf.
138 See id.
139 See id.
140 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 124, at 1; see also Buchanan, supra note 26, at
314–15 (discussing the CBO’s 2005 prediction that future generations will have lower
benefits).
141 See H.R. DOC. NO. 109-103, at 17 (2006), available at http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/
TR/TR06/tr06.pdf (noting the large number of people that rely on Social Security bene-
fits and suggesting that an abrupt change in the Social Security system could have a detri-
mental effect on many people).
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tions142—from a sudden adjustment in taxes or benefits in thirty-five
to forty-five years, current generations would have to pay more taxes
or receive fewer benefits.
Reasonable people may differ as to whether that is an appropriate
sacrifice, but I am not persuaded that it is.  At most, if there is to be a
premium placed on smooth transitions, this would argue for enacting
gradual changes in both taxes and benefits leading up to and after the
date of the depletion of the Trust Funds.143  It is unclear, though,
when such a phased-in policy change should begin.144  Given the pay-
roll tax increases in 1983 that created the Trust Funds,145 there is pre-
cedent for the government to impose fiscal changes on the Social
Security system without a phase-in period—and without a political
backlash.146  However, if such a phase-in period is desirable, the argu-
ments for when and how big the phase-in should be are arbitrary or at
least lack a coherent theoretical basis.147
It is also wise to bear in mind that these long-range estimates are
subject to error.148  If there is no obvious reason why the government
must plan now for a smooth transition through the date of the Trust
Funds’ depletion, there is greater reason for policymakers to hold off
on immediate policy changes pending future developments.  If it
turns out that the low-cost estimates are more accurate than the inter-
mediate- or high-cost estimates,149 Social Security may simply never
reach the date of the Trust Funds’ depletion.  If the high-cost esti-
mates are correct, the accuracy of those estimates will become evident
within a few years and will still allow for a phased-in adjustment to deal
with the 2030 depletion date.150
Finally, it would also be possible for a future Congress to phase in
the necessary changes both before and after the depletion date.  Since
142 See supra text accompanying notes 137–40.
143 See H.R. DOC. NO. 109-103, at 17 (2006), available at http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/
TR/TR06/tr06.pdf (advocating the benefits of a gradual phase-in).
144 Cf. id. (advocating the implementation of a gradual phase-in in a “timely way”).
145 See Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. 98-21, § 121, 97 Stat. 65, 80–84
(1983).
146 See, e.g., President Ronald Regan, Remarks on Signing the Social Security Amend-
ments of 1983 (Apr. 20, 1983), http://www.ssa.gov/history/reaganstmts.html#1983 (dis-
cussing the bipartisan efforts that went into passing the Social Security amendments that
raised tax rates in order to fund the Trust Funds).
147 See H.R. DOC. NO. 109-103, at 17 (2006), available at http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/
TR/TR06/tr06.pdf (failing to recommend a timeline for a gradual phase-in beyond that it
be “timely” and giving as the only rationale for a gradual phase-in to provide “advance
notice to workers”).
148 See id. at 6 (listing factors that can lead to uncertainty in predictions).
149 See Lowenstein, supra note 127, at 43 (noting that, historically, the Trustees’ low-
cost predictions are more accurate).
150 See H.R. DOC. NO. 109-103, at 52 tbl.IV.B3 (2006), available at http://www.ssa.gov/
OACT/TR/TR06/tr06.pdf.
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Congress can appropriate funds as it sees fit,151 it could decide that a
one-time twenty-six percent cut is inappropriate and instead authorize
extended but phased-down borrowing while benefit cuts are phased-
in.  Such an extended phase-in would partially defer the decrease in
the overall deficit (or increase in the overall annual surplus), but it
would not require a dramatic increase in the deficit from the year
prior to the Trust Funds depletion.152
The most basic issue here is appropriately summarized by the
question in the title of this Article: When should we worry about So-
cial Security deficits?  If we are focusing on the Social Security system
as an entity that might need adjustment to prevent future problems,
the fact is that current law will allow Social Security to continue on its
current path until at some point it might require large but managea-
ble changes in its tax and benefit structure.  While we should always
be vigilant about our fiscal policies, we currently have little reason to
change taxes or benefits to address an uncertain future adjustment.  If
there is to be a debate about whether now is the time to worry about
Social Security, it must be based on an analysis of the interactions of
Social Security with the overall federal deficit.
III
SOCIAL SECURITY AS PART OF THE FEDERAL FISCAL PICTURE:
WHAT ABOUT LONG-TERM DEFICITS?
Up to this point, I have argued that there is no reason to believe
that overall living standards will fall in the United States, such that
even pessimistic scenarios should not envision a future in which we
must decide how to divide a shrinking pie.153  Further, I have demon-
strated that the arguments for treating Social Security as a separate
entity within the federal government are relatively unconvincing.  I
have also demonstrated that if we do treat Social Security separately,
its prospects are either not worrisome or will become worrisome with
enough warning that there will be time to react appropriately.154  In
this final section, I analyze the interaction between the Social Security
system and the rest of the federal budget and assess whether the
problems elsewhere in that budget might offer a reason to change
Social Security’s finances.
A. Social Security’s Interaction with the Budget Deficit
For the purposes of this Article, I will not discuss the arguments
about whether budget deficits are harmful, including arguments
151 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
152 See supra note 130.
153 See supra Part II.A.
154 See supra Part II.B.
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about the composition of deficits and problems with how deficits are
measured.155  While I continue to believe that there are troubling in-
consistencies in the standard story of deficits,156 the present analysis
will proceed from the conventional starting point that deficits reduce
future economic growth.
As discussed earlier,157 the current annual surpluses that the So-
cial Security system runs158 allow the government to borrow less on
the private financial markets than it would need to borrow in the ab-
sence of the Trust Funds.159  Because of this decreased need for gov-
ernment borrowing, Social Security’s post-1983 surpluses have allowed
the economy to grow faster than it otherwise would have grown.160
Given current projections,161 the remainder of the federal budget
likely will not achieve balance or surplus any time soon.  If it does not,
after the Social Security surplus turns to an annual deficit, the total
borrowing by the federal government will be higher than it otherwise
would have been.162  If the total borrowing by the federal government
is high enough to create a crisis in the financial markets, of course,
not only will Social Security be in trouble, but everything else in the
economy will be at risk as well.
To be clear, making changes in the face of large overall deficits
has nothing to do with Social Security’s financial health.  If long-term
fiscal deficits are a sufficiently large problem, there would be strong
reason to find places in the budget to cut expenditures and to raise
revenues, no matter what the financial realities of any specific pro-
gram.  In other words, even a Social Security program that was pro-
jected to run persistent surpluses forever might be called upon to run
155 I have discussed these issues in Buchanan, supra note 26, at 286–98, and in Neil H.
Buchanan, Debt, Deficits, and Fiscal Policy: Three Essays (Aug. 5, 1996) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University) (on file with author).
156 See ROBERT EISNER, THE GREAT DEFICIT SCARES 25 (1997) (criticizing the omission
of public investment from most discussions of deficits).
157 See supra Part I.C.
158 See H.R. DOC. NO. 109-103, at 37 tbl.IV.A3 (2006), available at http://www.ssa.gov/
OACT/TR/TR06/tr06.pdf (showing a 2005 surplus of $171.8 billion).
159 Borrowing from foreign lenders is less than it would have been as well because
borrowing on the private financial markets has increasingly meant borrowing from foreign
governments that are active lenders in those markets. See Blinder, supra note 134, at
219–21 (discussing the relationship between rising deficits and U.S. foreign indebtedness).
160 This follows from the model of crowding out discussed. See id.  Less borrowing by
the government implies more spending by private businesses, increasing investment and
future GDP. See id.
161 See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 56, at 3 fig.1-1 (projecting deficits every year
through 2016, even assuming that tax cuts expire as currently scheduled).
162 This is because the government can use funds from the Trust Funds for other pro-
grams while Social Security runs a surplus, but the government must borrow from other
sources while Social Security is running a deficit. See Lowenstein, supra note 127, at 42; see
also OFFICE OF ECON. POLICY, supra note 132, at 12 (illustrating the interaction between the
Trust Funds’ balance and the federal budget).
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still larger surpluses to offset larger problems elsewhere.163  Similarly,
other taxes and user fees might be increased, and even well-run but
nonessential government spending programs might be cut.
The appropriate analysis from an aggregate viewpoint, therefore,
first asks whether the overall budget will require future spending cuts
or revenue increases and, if so, where such changes should be made.
Projections of the overall future budget situation are necessarily un-
certain, but it is possible to reach some broad conclusions by looking
at a relatively pessimistic long-term budget forecast.
The long-run fiscal gap is a measure of the net present value of all
future deficits and surpluses likely to be run by the federal govern-
ment.164  In an earlier article analyzing fiscal-gap measures, I pointed
out several significant analytical shortcomings in scholarly attempts to
measure the fiscal gap, focusing in particular on an analysis by
Gokhale and Smetters.165  I argued that fiscal-gap measures are a poor
alternative to the (admittedly flawed) ten-year deficit forecasts that are
currently available.166
While the fiscal-gap measure is an inadequate guide for overall
fiscal policy, Gokhale and Smetters’s computations can provide some
insight into the relative magnitude of the overall long-term budget
problem and into the composition of future deficits.  Gokhale and
Smetters calculate separate estimates of long-term deficits using a sev-
enty-five-year forecasting window—the approach used by Social Secur-
ity’s trustees in their annual reports167—and using an infinite
horizon.168  In each approach, their analysis projects large long-term
deficits that are overwhelmingly caused by Medicare expenditures.
For example, in estimates calculated using an infinite horizon, the
overall fiscal gap is $44.2 trillion, consisting of a $7 trillion Social Se-
curity shortfall and a $36.6 trillion Medicare gap; only $0.5 trillion is
attributable to the rest of the federal government.169  Social Security’s
gap is thus less than one-fifth of the Medicare gap.170  (In estimates
calculated using the seventy-five-year horizon, Social Security’s gap is
163 See OFFICE OF ECON. POLICY, supra note 132, at 12.
164 See Buchanan, supra note 26, at 282.
165 Id. at 310–15 (criticizing JAGADEESH GOKHALE & KENT SMETTERS, FISCAL AND GENER-
ATIONAL IMBALANCES: NEW BUDGET MEASURES FOR NEW BUDGET PRIORITIES (2003)).
166 See Buchanan, supra note 26, at 285–86.
167 See H.R. DOC. NO. 109-103, at 2 (2006), available at http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/
TR/TR06/tr06.pdf.
168 See GOKHALE & SMETTERS, supra note 165, at 2.
169 See id.
170 Given that the net present value of future GDP is estimated to be $682 trillion, see
id. at 36–37 tbl.4, Social Security’s shortfall, even in this pessimistic scenario, is only about
1% of future output.
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$1.6 trillion while Medicare’s gap is $15.1 trillion,171 making Social
Security’s long-term shortfall roughly one-ninth that of Medicare.
Given the relatively small magnitude of Social Security’s pro-
jected deficit and the uncertainty of whether there will be any Social
Security deficit at all,172 there is insufficient reason to move quickly to
fight a problem that might not materialize.  In the context of much
larger projected Medicare shortfalls, however, there might be a
stronger case for finding savings wherever they can be found, includ-
ing in the Social Security program.
However, two further considerations call this recommendation
into question.  First, the long-term estimates of Medicare’s ill health
are themselves questionable.  The large fiscal-gap numbers are de-
rived from an assumption that the cost of medical care will grow for
the next seventy-five years at a rate of one percentage point faster than
the growth rate of GDP.173  This rather arbitrarily assumes that medi-
cal care will consume ever larger shares of national income for at least
seventy-five years, an assumption that is certainly contestable.174  As I
will argue in future work, there are strong reasons to believe that the
cost of medical care will not grow nearly as quickly in future decades.
Second, the decision to cut Social Security (which is not far out of
balance and may indeed turn out not to be in long-term imbalance at
all) to finance Medicare—or to finance Medicare by cutting the rest
of the federal budget, which even Gokhale and Smetters estimate to
be essentially balanced175—might not be in the country’s best long-
term interests.  Even if Medicare’s costs do not decrease due to other
factors, it is bad policy to continue to enable health care expenditures
to rise by diverting resources from other areas of the budget.176
Rather, the government should control Medicare, and health-care
costs in general, sooner rather than later.  Put differently, this is an
independent reason to treat Social Security separately from the rest of
the budget.  The reason to do so, however, is not based on anything
unique about Social Security but rather on a desire for overall budget
discipline.  Isolating health care from the rest of the budget—both
Social Security and “other”—will force the difficult choices that will
finally address the bloat in our health-care system.
171 See GOKHALE & SMETTERS, supra note 165, at 34.
172 See Robert Eisner, Don’t Sock the Elderly, Help Them: Old Age Is Hard Enough, 5 ELDER
L.J. 181–82 (1997) ( “[T]here is no crisis in Social Security now and there is none looming
in the future.”).
173 See GOKHALE & SMETTERS, supra note 165, at 23.
174 See Buchanan, supra note 26, at 313–14.
175 See GOKHALE & SMETTERS, supra note 165, at 3.
176 See id. at 314 (“[W]hile it is possible to starve everything else in the service of health
care, it would be more sensible to recognize that the core of the problem lies not in the
public finance but in health policy.”).
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If the government cannot bring Medicare costs under control,
then it may ultimately be necessary to make hard choices about Social
Security and other financially sound programs.  However, the govern-
ment should at least try to fight the real problem first.  Acting in ad-
vance, moreover, can impose its own burdens by creating a fiscal drag
on the economy.177  This could work against our purported overall
goal of creating a robust economy that is better able to finance our
obligations while increasing future worker productivity.178
In the end, what is most important is to maintain perspective.
Waiting until a problem is too big to handle is one danger, but acting
hastily also has its costs.  Politicians of both parties have their reasons
for appearing concerned about a long-term problem, but the wrong
solution at the wrong time—especially to a problem that might not
exist—is hardly prudent stewardship for future generations.
B. Progressivity and Social Security
Finally, it is worthwhile to consider the distributive justice aspects
of the policy choices under discussion here.  The Social Security sys-
tem is overall a progressive program that paradoxically relies on a
non-progressive (and, above a relatively low limit, regressive) tax struc-
ture.179  While attempts to wring money out of Social Security could
be done progressively, any across-the-board cuts in benefits or in-
creases in rates would be regressive.180
The progressivity or regressivity of policy changes should be at
the forefront of all fiscal policy decisions, as I have argued else-
where.181  The issue is especially important here, both because of the
fundamentally important role that Social Security plays in making the
overall tax system progressive and because of a concern that arises
from the contractarian perspective I discussed above.182
The changes in Social Security’s tax structure enacted in 1983
were an explicit attempt to create a long-term deal by which the rest
177 See EISNER, supra note 156, at 28 (“[R]educing . . . deficits can . . . slow the economy
and even bring on a recession.”).
178 See discussion in supra Part I.A regarding the relationship between productivity
and the relative burden of supporting retirees.
179 Social Security’s tax structure imposes a 6.2% tax on both the employer and the
employee for the employee’s earnings from work, up to an annual maximum adjusted for
inflation (currently $94,200). See H.R. DOC. NO. 109-103, at 4 & tbl.II.B2 (2006), available
at http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/TR06/tr06.pdf.  With the cutoff, those who earn more
than $94,200 pay average tax rates below 6.2%, making the system regressive in that range.
See id.
180 Because of Social Security’s truncated tax structure, across-the-board tax increases
would proportionately harm higher-income workers the least.  Similarly, because of the
progressive nature of the benefit structure, across-the-board cuts in those benefits would
reduce the system’s redistributive mechanism.
181 See Buchanan, supra note 8, at 1184–93. R
182 See supra Part I.C–D.
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of the federal budget would be able to use Social Security’s surpluses
so long as the Treasury finances the retirement of the Baby Boomers
through general funds or borrowing later.183  If the distributive bur-
den of Social Security’s payroll taxes were the same as the distributive
burden of the taxes that we would otherwise have had to impose, then
there would be no distributive issue here.  In fact, however, the fed-
eral government’s income tax structure is progressive, while payroll
taxes are regressive, meaning that the imposition of higher payroll
taxes on middle- and lower-income workers while cutting income
taxes plausibly resulted in an overall regressive shift in the tax
burden.184
Cutting the benefits of Social Security recipients over the next
few decades, therefore, amounts to forcing middle-class people to pay
higher taxes when they were working but refusing to pay them the
higher benefits (financed by income taxes) that were implicit in the
1983 law.185  Moreover, raising Social Security payroll taxes in order to
reduce future deficits shifts the burden onto the children of those
who paid higher-than-necessary payroll taxes.
As before, of course, the contractarian perspective has its limits.
It might be that the current situation forces us to make regressive
changes that we originally thought would be unnecessary.  Given the
overwhelmingly regressive effect of the Bush tax cuts,186 though, there
is strong reason to believe that federal fiscal policy during this time
precisely reflects the perverse outcome described above: tax cuts for
the rich financed by tax increases for the non-rich.187  Even if there
were no social contract implied by the 1983 changes, the realities of
the current situation call not for regressive changes in the Social Se-
curity program but for a rollback of the regressive tax cuts of the early
twenty-first century.  If more deficit cutting is necessary, the best ap-
proach would be to look for additional progressive policies, such as
reinvigorating (rather than repealing) the estate tax and other taxes
on large concentrations of wealth.
183 See generally Contract, supra note 73 (discussing 1983 changes in Social Security from
a contractarian perspective).
184 It is possible, again, that in the absence of the Social Security surplus, the govern-
ment might have imposed taxes or budget cuts regressively.  If the changes had roughly
mirrored the existing structure of taxes, though, the most likely outcome would have been
an increase in income taxes on upper-income taxpayers.
185 See Contract, supra note 73.
186 See Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, 117
Stat. 752; Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16,
115 Stat. 38.
187 See Teresa Tritch, Editorial, Tilting the Tax System in Favor of the Rich, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
4, 2005 (arguing that the $173 billion Social Security Trust Funds surplus, “which comes
from taxes paid by working people at the middle and lower rungs of the income ladder, . . .
is being used to mask the true cost of today’s deficit-financed tax cuts on estates, capital
gains and corporations”).
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In the current political climate, of course, progressive tax
changes appear to be unlikely.  That climate, however, can change
quickly.  Even if it does not, the vagaries of the long-term budget pro-
jections should make us especially loath to “fix” Social Security by en-
gaging in immediate regressive tax and spending changes.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, I discussed the basic nature of retirement financ-
ing and put Social Security in perspective as a pay-as-you-go system
that has been adjusted to address long-term demographic trends.  I
then analyzed whether the Social Security system faces long-term
funding problems that require changes in the structure and benefits
of the program.  Finally, I extended the analysis to consider whether
the overall budgetary situation in the United States over the next few
decades is so dire that it requires changes in Social Security as part of
a broader financial rescue effort.
As a threshold issue, I demonstrated that any changes in Social
Security cannot be justified by the concern that demographic changes
will result in lower standards of living.  Even though the ratio of
nonworkers to workers will rise as the Baby Boom generation retires,
increases in productivity will more than make up for that increase,
allowing future workers to support both themselves and future retir-
ees at higher standards of living than are now possible.  Without ques-
tion, there will be higher per-capita standards of living in the future,
distributive issues aside.
Even so, it is possible that the Social Security system is currently
on an unsound financial footing, requiring a change in its financing
even though both future workers and future retirees will be able to
enjoy higher standards of living than we enjoy today.  Looking at the
Social Security system’s finances as separate from the rest of the fed-
eral government’s fiscal activities, I have argued that the purported
long-term challenges facing Social Security either are unlikely to oc-
cur or at least do not require immediate action to address possible
future problems.
It is possible, however, that Social Security—even if it is healthy
on its own merits—should be part of a larger effort to address long-
term fiscal shortfalls.  Looking at one particularly pessimistic projec-
tion, I noted that the predicted large future deficits are overwhelm-
ingly due to predicted large shortfalls in Medicare financing and not
in Social Security.  While it is possible to use Social Security and other
parts of the federal budget to enable Medicare’s problems to go unad-
dressed, I have suggested that it is wise at least to start with an attempt
to solve Medicare’s problems directly.  Given the regressive nature of
likely Social Security cuts (or tax increases), moreover, I have sug-
\\server05\productn\C\CRN\92-2\CRN204.txt unknown Seq: 33 26-DEC-06 15:44
2007] SOCIAL SECURITY AND GOVERNMENT DEFICITS 289
gested that we should be especially unwilling to fix our fiscal problems
through Social Security changes rather than through progressive tax
policies.
We should always be concerned about the possibility of long-term
budget imbalances, but the current arguments for changing Social Se-
curity now to address possible future imbalances are unconvincing.
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